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NOTES
Gulf South Bank & Trust Company v. Holden: A
Warning to Bankers Honoring Letters of Credit
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Holden,' the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal held that a bank which paid on a letter of
credit was not entitled to recover reimbursement from its customer where
the documents presented did not strictly comply with the terms of the
letter of credit agreement. Specifically, the court refused to allow the
bank to recover on a promissory note executed to secure the issuance
of the letter of credit. By its ruling, the court of appeal reversed the
trial court which had rendered a judgment in favor of the bank. The
appellate court's rationale in so holding was based on two factors: (1)
Gulf South Bank and Trust (hereinafter GSBT) breached the terms of
the credit agreement by funding without complying precisely with all of
its requirements; and (2) GSBT paid on the letter of credit after the
term of the agreement had expired.
Eric Holden was one of five members of Deeks Limited (hereinafter
Deeks), a limited partnership, which sought to invest in Contessa Vali
Thoroughbred Syndicate (hereinafter Syndicate). Deeks was one of fifteen
investors in Syndicate, each of whom was required to invest $20,000.
Pursuant to this enterprise, Deeks sought the issuance of a $20,000
letter of credit from GSBT. The bank complied with the request and
issued the letter on December 11, 1984.2 According to GSBT, the letter
of credit was secured by a $4,000 promissory note from each member
of Deeks.3 Eric Holden's note was dated December 21, 1982, almost
two years prior to the issuance of the credit. GSBT also issued the
Syndicate a $300,000 line of credit which was secured not only by the
Copyright 1991, by LOuiSIANA LAW REvmw.
I. 562 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
2. The letter of credit provided that a request to GSBT for payment would be
honored on sight when ". . . accompanied by an affidavit signed by an officer of the
holder of this Letter of Credit certifying that (i) a default exists under any loan of
Contessa Vali Thoroughbred Syndicate, a Louisiana Partnership in Commendam, due such
holder which this Letter of Credit may secure." Id. at 1133.
3. Id. at 1132.
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Deeks letter of credit but letters from the fourteen other investors.4 On
December 26, 1985, GSBT called the letter of credit and applied the
funds to Syndicate's loan. At the time the letter of credit was called,
Syndicate had borrowed $295,000 against the $300,000 credit line es-
tablished with GSBT.
Although GSBT received payment on the promissory notes of four
members of Deeks, Holden refused to pay, claiming that the bank
breached the contract for lack of consideration. The court of appeal
agreed that Holden was not responsible to pay the note. It grounded
its holding not on whether Holden had a defense to payment but on
factors pertaining to the letter of credit agreement. In any event, the
effect of the decision was to grant Holden a $4,000 windfall which in
turn caused the bank a $4,000 loss plus interest.
The Holden opinion raises a significant question as to the standard
of compliance Louisiana courts require banks to satisfy pursuant to
payment on letters of credit, particularly in wrongful honor cases. The
decision on its face suggests that a bank which pays on a letter of
credit, despite minor discrepancies between the documents presented and
the credit agreement requirements, will have no right of reimbursement
from its customers. Stated differently, Holden indicates that banks will
be held to a strict compliance standard in those cases in which it chooses
to pay on a letter of credit. This case is troublesome, however, because
the court seemed to get' .tied up in letter of credit law and perhaps
missed the central issue the suit raised: whether Holden, as an obligor
on a promissory note, had any defense of payment to GSBT.
This note will evaluate the holding and rationale of Holden by
considering several factors. First, this note will present an overview of
the essential aspects of the letter of credit arrangement and will suggest
that the facts in Holden present an anomaly vis-A-vis the typical letter
of credit arrangement. Second, this note will focus specifically on the
two issues the court deemed decisive for its holding: (1) the timeliness
of the payment on the letter; and (2) the nature of compliance required
pursuant to such payment. Third, this note will address whether unjust
enrichment may have provided an additional basis on which GSBT could
have recovered. Fourth, the case of Scott v. Bank of Coushatta' will
be considered in order to show that this case, in conjunction with Holden,
places a strict duty on a bank to exercise the utmost caution in its
dealings with customers. Finally, in light of the stringent compliance
4. For an interesting discussion of Letters of Credit in limited partnership financing,
see T.W. Grebenar and T.H. Young, Letters of Credit in Limited Partnership Financing-
A Legal Time Bomb?, in Letters of Credit: Current Thinking in America (W. Hillman
ed. 1987).
5. 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987).
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standards Holden sets forth, this note will propose several guidelines to
protect banks from the problems this case presents for banking activities.
II. PRECEPTS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENT
General Precepts
The letter of credit is a useful financing mechanism which provides
the credit of a third party, generally a bank, as an independent assurance
of payment to another party. 6 A letter of credit is "an engagement by
a bank or other person made by the request of a customer ... that
the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon com-
pliance with the conditions specified in the credit." 7 This arrangement
normally consists of at least three parties: (1) the customer or buyer
who causes an issuer to issue a credit;8 (2) an issuer who issues the
credit; 9 and (3) the beneficiary of a credit who is entitled under the
terms of the agreement to draw or demand payment. 10
One of the significant features of the letter of credit arrangement
is that each of the contracts between the respective parties is independent
of the others. This principle is critical to the successful function of the
letter of credit." Thus, if the beneficiary presents documents that con-
6. Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer, 45 Md. L. Rev. 432 (1986) [hereinafter Leon];
see generally Comment, Letters of Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev.
581 (1979); Hillman, An Introductory Lecture on Letters of Credit, in Letters of Credit:
Current Thinking in America (W. Hillman ed. 1987); H. Harfield, Bank Credits and
Acceptances (5th ed. 1974).
7. La. R.S. 10:5-103(l)(a) (1983). Although the statute requires "compliance," there
is no statutory reference to the standard of compliance. The nature of the standard has
become a question for the courts and varies not only from case to case but from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a matter of state law and thus
each jurisdiction interprets the compliance standard independently from other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, federal courts that hear letter of credit cases under diversity jurisdiction are
bound to apply state law pursuant to the Erie rule; cf. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); see Hotchkiss, Strict Compliance in Letter-of-Credit
Law: How Uniform is the Uniform Commercial Code?, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 288, 289 (1991)
[hereinafter Hotchkiss]; Task Force on the Study of UCC Article 5, An Examination of
U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit). 45 Bus. Law. 1521, 1531 (1990).
8. La. R.S. 10:5-103(1)(g) (1983).
9. La. R.S. 10:5-103(!)(c) (1983). In addition to the issuer, oftentimes there is a
confirming bank which honors a letter of credit already issued by another bank and
engages that the letter of credit will be honored by the issuer or a third bank. La. R.S.
10:5-103(l)(f) (1983); see also Leon, supra note 6, at 436.
10. La. R.S. 10:5-103(1)(d) (1983).
11. Hotchkiss, supra note 7, at 290; see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central
Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 720 F.2d 1291 (1983); Auto Servicio
v. Compania Anonima Venezolana, 586 F. Supp. 259, 263 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 765
1991]
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form to the terms of the letter of credit agreement, the bank is under
an independent duty to pay despite any problems which may or may
not exist in the underlying contract between the beneficiary and cus-
tomer. 12
The independence principle has particular application to what is
called a "guarantee" or "standby" letter of credit, the kind found in
Holden. This type of credit arrangement is used in situations in which
one party seeks to protect itself from another party's inability to perform.
Professor Leon aptly describes the nature of the "standby" agreement:
Because a standby letter of credit is payable upon the default
of a party to perform its obligation, this type of credit is in
the nature of a loan from the issuer to the customer, and a
guarantee from the issuer to the beneficiary. It is, however,
legally distinguishable from a guarantee and because of the
independence principle, it actually offers the beneficiary more
security than a guarantee.3
The duty the bank owes its customer is to examine the documents
presented so as to ascertain whether on their face, they comply with
the terms of the credit. 4 The banker must use "care" under the ap-
plicable UCC provision"5 and must use "reasonable care" under the
UCP.16 The bank, however, assumes no liability for the genuineness,
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law); First National Bank v. Carmouche,
515 So. 2d 785, 788 (La. 1987). Berry v. Bank of Louisiana, 439 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1983); Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 735 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 885 (1981).
12. The principle of independence is set forth in La. R.S. 10:5-114(1) (1983 and
Supp. 1991). It states in pertinent part:
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents
conform to the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary.
The independence principle is also found in Article 3 of the Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) which states:
Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned
with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such
contract(s) is included in the credit.
Parties to a letter of credit may subject their agreement to the UCP rules adopted by
the International Chamber of Commerce (1983 revision). See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Carmouche, 515 So. 2d 785, 787 n.2 (La. 1987). These rules apply only to documentary
letters of credit issued by banks, will be binding on parties only to the extent they agree
to be bound, and may be used by courts as suppletive rules in contract resolution disputes;
see Hawkland & Holland, UCC Series § 5-102:07 (1986); Leon, supra note 6, at 439.
13. Leon, supra note 6, at 443 (footnote omitted).
14. La. R.S. 10:5-109(2) (1983).
15. Id.
16. UCP art. 15 (rev. 1983).
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falsification, or effect of any document which appears on its face to
be regular." The bank, as well as other parties to the arrangement,
does have an additional duty to exercise good faith in the performance
and enforcement of every contract.18
Application of Precepts to Holden
The facts in Holden are distinguishable from typical cases in which
there are at least three different parties: issuer, customer, and benefi-
ciary. 19 In Holden, GSBT reacquired the letter of credit it had issued
to Syndicate, although the facts of the case fail to suggest a link as to
how GSBT actually received it. GSBT, from a functional standpoint,
actually became both the issuer and beneficiary (at least its transferee),
since the credit was used to secure the loan to Syndicate.20
It would seem that the policies favoring strict compliance in a case
where the issuer pays a third party to the detriment of the customer
are inapposite to the facts presented in Holden. Here, all the bank had
done, functionally, was to exercise a right of set off against the Syndicate
loan. Because GSBT owed a debt to Syndicate (obligation to pay on
the letter of credit) and Syndicate owed a debt to GSBT (obligation to
pay on the loan), the bank became both obligor and obligee. Thus,
although in a technical sense, one might view GSBT as having paid on
the letter of credit, practically, by a mere paper transaction, the bank
set off the debt Syndicate owed by funding its account with the amount
of the letter of credit.2' There would seem to be little justification for
17. La. R.S. 10:5-109(2) (1983).
18. La. R.S. 10:1.201 and -203 (1983 and Supp. 1991).
19. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Carmouche, 515 So. 2d 785 (La. 1987); this case actually
involved four parties: an issuing bank, a customer, a beneficiary, and a draft endorsee.
20. The bank promised that it would not call the note unless it had to pay on the
letter of credit. Why the parties went the route of acquiring a letter of credit to ensure
the loan to Syndicate is unclear. It would seem that Syndicate could have simply gone
to the bank and requested a loan to be secured by other collateral or individual promissory
notes such as the one Holden signed.
21. La. R.S. 6:316(C) (Supp. 1991) gives banks the privilege of set off. It states in
Section C:
In the event that the depositor should default under any loan, extension of
credit or other direct or indirect obligation of any nature and kind whatsoever
in favor of the depository bank, the bank shall have the right to apply any
and all funds that the depositor then has on deposit with the bank or on which
the bank has taken a security interest under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Com-
mercial Laws (R.S. 10:9-101, et seq.) towards the payment of the depositor's
indebtedness or obligations, whether such payment satisfies the indebtedness or
obligations in whole or in part. The exercise of the bank's remedies under this
Subsection shall not affect any other rights and remedies available to the bank
19911
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Holden to acquire a $4,000 windfall on a promissory note simply because
GSBT applied a letter of credit, which it held as security, to Syndicate's
debt. Holden was not prejudiced by such an action.
The court's excursion into letter of credit law, however, misses the
decisive issue in the case, namely, whether Holden had a defense to
payment on the promissory note. Ostensibly, Holden would be able to
argue that the bank paid on the letter without presenting to itself the
necessary affidavits the agreement required. Yet, because Holden was
an independent party in the contract with GSBT on the promissory
note, he should have had to prove whether the bank's failure to comply
strictly with the terms of the agreement constituted a breach to such
an extent that it effectively extinguished his obligation to pay the note.
The fourth circuit skirted the issue by stating, "[W]e are not bound
by a theory of the case.""2 This, however, would seem to have been
the pivotal issue and should have warranted a significant portion of the
court's discussion. Nevertheless, because the court chose to analyze the
problem by focusing on letter of credit law, the following analysis will
address both reasons on which the court denied GSBT reimbursement.
III. TimLY HONORED DRAr
The court of appeal in Holden denied GSBT reimbursement on the
grounds that it paid on the letter of credit after the agreement had
terminated. The agreement stated in pertinent part:
This letter may be drafted against, in full, without being ac-
companied by the Affidavit referred to above from December
11, 1984 until January 11, 1985 if this Letter of Credit is not
renewed by January 11, 1985 for a period of one (1) year expiring
January 11, 1986, in the face amount of $20,000.00 and in a
form acceptable to the beneficiary, its transferees or assigns.23
GSBT argued that the language allowed an additional one year
extension in the term. The fourth circuit disagreed. The court stated:
There is nothing in the record to show that the letter of credit
was renewed by Deeks Limited or that the Contessa Vali Syn-
following the depositor's default.
This statute contemplates the bank's right of set off by applying funds on deposit to
debts owed by a depositor. Admittedly, although a standby letter of credit backed only
by a contingent promissory note is not in fact an insurable deposit within the meaning
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear
Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986)), this does not change the practical effect
of what GSBT has done by a mere paper transaction.
22. Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Holden, 562 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1990).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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dicate as beneficiary of the letter of credit approved the extension
as required by the quoted provision. The request letter une-
quivocally seeks issuance of a letter of credit limited to a term
of January 13, 1984 through January 11, 1985. Gulf South could
not unilaterally extend or vary the term of the letter of credit. 2
Louisiana statutory provisions do not specifically address the liability
of an issuer who pays after the term has expired, although in such a
situation the issue of good faith may arise .2 The only "time require-
ment" focuses on the duty of the issuer to pay a draft or demand
within a reasonable time.26 The circumstances in Holden, however, do
not indicate that GSBT breached this particular duty; the question raised
in Holden was whether the payment occurred within the time frame of
the agreement. Once the letter of credit agreement expired, the duty of
the issuer to pay, in this case GSBT, terminated.27
The problem presented in Holden involves contractual interpretation
rather than statutory application. The letter of credit agreement could
certainly have been construed in favor of GSBT. The conditional clause,
"if this Letter of Credit is not renewed by January 11, 1985,' '2s could
have been read only to limit the bank's option of not having to use
an accompanying affidavit after January 11, 1985. The clause does not
itself answer whether an extension was contemplated by the parties. The
court opined that nothing in the record showed that the letter of credit
was renewed. 29 Arguably, however, the commercial relationship between
Syndicate and GSBT implicitly extended the letter of credit at least to
the term of the loan arrangement with Syndicate. This would seem to
be the case both as a matter of logic and commercial function. Otherwise,
GSBT would have been unsecured for $20,000 of the Syndicate's loan
as of January 11, 1985.
Additionally, the fourth circuit noted that GSBT could not unilat-
erally extend the term of the letter of creditA0 This conclusion seems
24. Id.
25. See La. R.S. 10:1-201 and -203 (1983 and Supp. 1991).
26. La. R.S. 10:1-204, 5-112 (1983); see also UCP article 16(c) which requires the
bank to examine and determine whether to pay documents within a "reasonable time."
This duty has been interpreted strictly in several jurisdictions: FDIC v. Vogel, 437 F.
Supp. 660 (E.D. Wis. 1977); The Bazaar, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 168
11. App. 3d 811, 523 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988); Waidmann v. Mercantile Trust
Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 711 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). In other jurisdictions, however,
this duty has been minimized so as to exonerate the issuer: People's State Bank of Clay
County v. Gulf Oil, 446 N.E.2d 1358 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).
27. See J. White & R. Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code 847 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter White & Summers].
28. Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Holden, 562 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1990).
29. Id.
30. Id.
19911
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somewhat simplistic. The agreement stated that any renewal needed to
be in a "form acceptable to the beneficiary, its transferees or assigns.'",
As noted previously, from a functional standpoint, the bank was not
only the issuer but also the beneficiary or, at a minimum, the benefi-
ciary's transferee. This is because Syndicate gave GSBT the letter of
credit as security on the loan from the bank. The court, however, never
addressed this problem. Instead, in an almost mechanical fashion, the
court applied a strict compliance standard which logically required the
bank to give itself permission to approve the extension.
In short, considering the unusual situation presented, in which the
bank was both the holder and the issuer of the letter of credit, the
court's refusal to allow GSBT reimbursement for untimely payment is
dubious. The opinion, by doing so, focuses too much time on letter of
credit technicalities while completely ignoring commercial actuality.
IV. WRONGFUL HONOR
Holden represents a case of wrongful honor and is distinguishable
from cases involving wrongful dishonor. This distinction extends further
than merely stating that in the former situation the bank pays whereas
in the latter situation it does not; some courts apply varying standards
of compliance depending on whether the case is one of wrongful honor
or wrongful dishonor."
31. Id.
32. Many American jurisdictions in wrongful dishonor cases have applied a strict
compliance principle to situations in which a bank refuses to pay on a letter of credit
because of discrepancies between the documents presented and the requirements in the
letter agreement. Professor Hotchkiss notes that this principle is operative in eleven states,
supra note 7, at 292 n.13; see, e.g., Bebco Distrib., Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
485 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 1986); Raiffeisen-Zentralkasse Tirol v. First Nat'l Bank, 671 P.2d
1008 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Armac Indus. v. Citytrust, 203 Conn. 394, 525 A.2d 77
(1987); American Nat'l Bank v. Cashman Bros. Marine Contracting, 550 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); First Nat'l Bank of Council Bluffs v. Rosebud Housing Auth., 291
N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1980); State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Morganstein,
703 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1986); United Commodities-Greece v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 64 N.Y.2d
449, 478 N.E.2d 172, 489 N.Y.S.2d 31 (N.Y. 1985); Dubose Steel, Inc. v. Branch Banking
& Trust Co., 72 N.C. App. 598, 324 S.E.2d 859 (1985); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v.
Dakota Northwestern Bank, 321 N.W.2d 516 (N.D. 1982); Olson v. United States Nat'l
Bank of Oregon, 70 Or. App. 460, 689 P.2d 1021 (1984); Security State Bank of Basin
v. Basin Petroleum Servs., 713 P.2d 1170 (Wyo. 1986); see, e.g., Board of Trade of San
Francisco v. Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law);
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. of Am. v. Bank of Virginia, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983)
(applying Virginia law); see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230
(5th Cir. 1983) (applying Louisiana law).
Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, have opted for a lesser, substantial compliance
standard even in wrongful honor cases. See Hotchkiss, supra note 7, at 294 n.21. See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 256 S.E.2d 383 (1979);
NOTES
Wrongful Honor-A Bifurcated Standard or Strict Compliance?
A wrongful honor suit normally arises after an issuer bank has paid
a beneficiary on a letter of credit despite the customer's desire that the
issuer withhold payment for some reason. Issuers often will procure the
customer's funds or other collateral and will merely debit the customer's
account after it has made payment of the letter. The customer's ultimate
argument against the issuer is an allegation of a breach of a Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:5-109 duty."
Early on, strict compliance was adopted as the standard in wrongful
honor cases. In Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, Ltd. ,14 Dawson
Partners purchased 3,000 kilos of vanilla beans, using a letter of credit
for payment. The letter required the seller to present a quality certificate
issued by two experts. Equitable Trust paid when the seller presented
a quality certificate signed by one expert. The court held the bank to
a strict compliance standard thus denying the bank reimbursement.
This harsh approach has been modified significantly by some ju-
risdictions in cases involving wrongful honor. These courts have held
that when there is minor noncompliance in the demand for payment by
the beneficiary and the issuer pays despite the noncompliance, the issuer
is still entitled to reimbursement from its customer.
For example, in Transamerica Delaval, Inc. v. Citibank," the un-
derlying contract called for Transamerica to sell diesel power generators
First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 413 N.E.2d 1288 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1981); Peoples State Bank of Clay County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 446 N.E.2d 1358 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983); Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980); Bank of Montreal v. Federal Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Shawnee, 622 F.
Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law); Exchange Mutual Ins. v. Commerce
Union Bank, 686 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v.
Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 431 (Utah 1974).
Other jurisdictions have analyzed letters of credit under what might be called a qualified
strict compliance standard. Under this view, courts apply a strict compliance rule but
allow for minor or immaterial deviations from the terms of the letter of credit. See
Hotchkiss, supra note 7, at 295 n.29. She notes that only four jurisdictions have proposed
such a view (Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Texas).
An approach that requires anything less than strict compliance has been criticized because
it places the issuer in a tenuous position. The banker is put in the position of having to
look beyond the face of the documents, to investigate the realities of the transaction,
and to weigh the credibility of documents, customs, and beneficiaries. See Hotchkiss,
supra note 7, at 295; see also Dolan, Strict Compliance with Letters of Credit: Striking
a Fair Balance, 102 Banking L.J. 18, 28 (1987). The issuer is thus placed in the undesirable
position of choosing between a suit by the beneficiary of the letter of credit and the risk
of refusal of reimbursement by the customer. See Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v.
Board of Co. Commn'r, 634 P.2d 32, 143 (Colo. 1981) (Lohr, J., dissenting).
33. See White & Summers, supra note 27, at 862.
34. 27 Lloyd's Rep. 49, 52 (H.L. 1927).
35. 545 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1991]
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to Electrical Work and Maintenance (EWM). A Citibank subsidiary
issued a "letter of guaranty" to Transamerica (its customer) in favor
of EWM for $2,809,833. A second bank took over the subsidiary's
rights and liabilities. Disagreements arose between Transamerica and
EWM, and after Transamerica refused to extend the letter of credit,
Citibank paid on the letter. Citibank reimbursed itself from Transa-
merica's account and Transamerica then sued Citibank to recover the
amount. It argued that Citibank was not entitled to reimbursement
because the demand by EWM did not technically comply with the letter
of credit agreement. The court, however, applied a lesser, "bifurcated
standard" and held that substantial compliance was sufficient to ex-
onerate Citibank from any liability to its customer.
This case illustrates a clear departure from the strict compliance test
set forth in Dawson Partners. Transamerica, and other cases like it,6
suggest that, at least in some jurisdictions, courts are willing to apply
a lesser compliance standard in wrongful honor cases than would be
applied in wrongful dishonor situations. White and Summers state:
The case [Transamerica] is representative of many other cases
in which customer sues the issuer for wrongful honor. It is
representative first because the customer loses; the customer
almost always loses. It is representative secondly because the
court adopts a more generous standard of measuring the bank's
acts vis a vis the customer than might have been applied vis a
vis the beneficiary if the bank had chosen to dishonor. 7
Wrongful Honor-The Louisiana Standard
In Holden, the court denied GSBT reimbursement because it failed
to comply strictly with the terms of the letter of agreement by paying
on the letter without the requisite attached affidavit certifying that
Syndicate had defaulted on its loan to the bank."8 One might have
expected, based on cases like Transamerica, that the fourth circuit would
have exonerated the bank so as to allow it reimbursement. The court,
however, clearly rejected any "bifurcated" or "substantial compliance"
standard in the event of wrongful honor. The court based its ruling
squarely on First National Bank v. Carmouche.3 9
36. See Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 612 F. Supp. 1533,
1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); Far Eastern Textile Ltd. v.
City Nat'l Bank & Trust, 430 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
37. White & Summers, supra note 27, at 863.
38. Gulf South Bank & Trust Co. v. Holden, 562 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1990). The court noted that the bank is under a strict statutory duty to examine the
documents with care for compliance with the terms of the letter of credit pursuant to
La. R.S. 10:5-109(2).
39. 515 So. 2d 785 (La. 1987).
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In First National Bank, the bank brought suit against the customer
to collect funds expended in paying a letter of credit. The customer
alleged that the bank was in bad faith because it paid the letter of
credit despite indications that its customer might not have owed the
money. The court held that the bank's obligation to pay was independent
of any contractual problems that may have existed between its customer
and the beneficiary. Pursuant to its analysis, the court addressed the
question of compliance and commented that "[t]he bank is under a
strict statutory duty to examine the documents with care" prior to
payment on a letter of credit.4 The decision in First National Bank,
however, turned more on the issue of the independence of the contract
between the issuer and the beneficiary than on the issue of strict or
substantial compliance.
A similar conclusion regarding the nature of compliance in wrongful
honor cases was reached in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank.4 1
The United States Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, stated that any
documentation necessary to support payment under a documentary letter
of credit must conform exactly to the requirements of the credit ar-
rangement.
It would appear after Holden that the doctrine of strict compliance
has become well-settled in Louisiana in wrongful honor cases. The
Holden court, however, failed to explain why this is the appropriate
standard. In Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust,42
for example, the United States District Court set forth a significant
policy reason why a lesser "substantial" compliance standard should be
the rule in wrongful honor cases. It stated that such a standard is,
designed to permit the bank to retain flexibility in dealing with
simultaneous customer pressure to reject and beneficiary pressure
to accept. This discretion ostensibly preserves the bank's min-
isterial function of dealing solely with documents and the in-
sulation of the letter of credit from performance problems. .... 4.
Notwithstanding this policy argument, Louisiana has opted to return to
the strict standard first set forth in Dawson Partners. The question then
becomes whether the issuer is entitled to any reimbursement if it fails
to conform strictly to the credit agreement requirements.
Reimbursement
Louisiana law provides that if an issuer has duly honored a draft
or demand for payment on a letter of credit, the issuer is entitled to
40. Id. at 788.
41. 717 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
42. 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
43. Id. at 1539.
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immediate reimbursement of any payment made under the credit." The
problem arises, however, when the issuer has honored a draft without
fulfilling the "strict compliance" standard.
Louisiana courts have uniformly embraced the position that reim-
bursement is not recoverable by the issuer if it honors payment on the
basis of noncomplying documents. For example, in Holden, GSBT failed
to comply with the terms of the letter of credit by not attaching a
required affidavit to the demand for payment. The court admitted that
such an act might have been viewed as absurd given the fact that GSBT
was both the holder of the letter and the Syndicate's creditor. Never-
theless, the court refused the bank reimbursement.
The same principle was espoused both in First National Bank v.
Carmouche' and Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank.4 For ex-
ample, in First National Bank, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
The bank is under a strict statutory duty to examine the doc-
uments with care, La. R.S. 10:5-109(2), and cannot seek re-
imbursement from the customer if the documents are not in
proper compliance with the terms of the letter. 47
The rationale for refusing the issuer reimbursement is difficult to
understand when the customer has not actually been prejudiced. Eric
Holden, for example, got exactly what he was entitled to. He executed
a promissory note in return for the bank's issuance of a letter of credit
in favor of Syndicate. Allowing Holden to seize upon a technical detail
in order to escape from liability on his promissory note to GSBT seems
unduly harsh. When a customer receives exactly what he bargained for
and then is allowed, as it were, to reimburse the bank and then receive
the reimbursement back, it amounts to nothing less than a windfall.48
It should be recalled that the factual situation in Holden is not
typical of normal letter of credit arrangements, given the fact that GSBT
held the letter of credit as security for the debt of Syndicate in whose
favor the letter was originally issued. The fourth circuit failed to take
this into consideration. The application of a strict compliance standard
under these circumstances, resulting in a denial of reimbursement to
GSBT, does not further the policies behind the application of the rule
in otherwise normal circumstances. Even in a typical letter of credit
arrangement, some academic authorities suggest that banks should rarely
44. La. R.S. 10:5-114(3) (1983).
45. 515 So. 2d 785 (La. 1987).
46. 717 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. First National Bank, 515 So. 2d at 788 (emphasis added).
48. White & Summers, supra note 27, at 864.
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be refused reimbursement.49 As a matter of policy, if all of the essential
requirements of a letter of credit are complied with, the integrity of
the transaction should not be challenged on technical or inconsequential
reasons. In particular, Louisiana courts should strike a balance between
the integrity of letter of credit transactions and the requirement of their
fluidity if the objective of increased dealings to the mutual satisfaction
of all interested parties is to be enhanced. 0
V. UNYUST ENRICHMENT
After Holden, it seems evident that Louisiana law requires strict
compliance, pursuant to payment on a letter of credit, as a basis for
the right of reimbursement. One issue, however, that neither the parties
nor the court raised, was whether an issuer that fails to comply tech-
nically with the requirements of the letter of credit may recover its
payment under a theory of unjust enrichment; this question arises,
particularly in a case like Holden where the customer received a windfall
at the bank's expense.
The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment
The Louisiana Civil Code appears to provide some statutory basis
for the action of unjust enrichment. Article 2055 states in pertinent
part:
Equity, as intended in the preceding articles, is based on the
principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of
another and that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly
at the expense of another."
49. White and Summers state:
For several reasons we believe it should be an unusual case in which the customer
successfully recovers from the issuing bank for wrongful honor. In the usual
case the bank's bias and its selfish interest run exclusively toward dishonor....
In the normal case the issuer's most obvious and intense interest will be in its
customer as against a diffuse and remote interest in the integrity of the letter
of credit system. If we are to preserve the independence principle and bolster
the utility of letters of credit, the law must encourage banks to act in a relatively
disinterested way, namely to pay. Moreover, one should have some sympathy
for the bank in this position. The bank earns only a small fee, has a limited
amount of time to make a decision and, at least when it acts in good faith,
courts should be sympathetic to its judgment about beneficiary's compliance
with the credit.
Id. at 863 (footnote omitted).
50. Cf. Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230,
234 (Ist Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013, 88 S. Ct. 1263 (1968).
51. La. Civ. Code art. 2055.
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Some commentators, however, have suggested that Louisiana Civil Code
article 2055 (formerly articles 1964, 1965 and 1966) provides a cause of
action only when there has been a contract because the article is located
in Title IV, entitled "Conventional Obligations or Contracts.'"" This
requirement certainly would be satisfied by the factual situation in
Holden, where a contract existed between Holden and GSBT.
The landmark decision regarding the action for unjust enrichment
was Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc. 3 This decision set forth five
requirements necessary to recover under this cause of action: (1) an
enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the en-
richment and impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification for the
enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) an absence of a remedy provided
by law. Since the Minyard decision, these requirements have become
well-settled as a basis of any recovery for unjust enrichment.5 ' Further,
all five requirements must be satisfied due to the fact that Louisiana
law is fundamentally hostile to this cause of action."
The fourth requirement, an absence of justification for the enrich-
ment and impoverishment, of an action for unjust enrichment is probably
the most stringent. The law does not allow recovery for any unjust
enrichment, rather, only the unjust enrichment for which there is no
justification in law or contract . 6 Tate further states, "The action can
only be used in the case of unjust enrichments without legal justification;
and then only if no other practical remedy is available by which the
impoverishment might be or might reasonably have been avoided."' 7
Application to Holden
Although GSBT conceivably could have met four of the five re-
quirements necessary to set forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment,
the fourth element cited above would have presented a significant prob-
52. See Tate, The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 883,
894 (1976).
53. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
54. See Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974); Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974); Brignac v. Boisdore, 288 So. 2d 31 (La. 1973);
Mouton v. State, 525 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 1112
(1988); Barton Land Co. v. Dutton, 541 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
543 So. 2d 23 (1989); Abbeville Lumber Co. v. Richard, 350 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1977); Wilkinson v. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 537 So. 2d 1222 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1989); FPS, Inc. v. Continental Contractors, Inc., 537 So. 2d 831 (La.
App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 540 So. 2d 328 (1989).
55. See Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 515
F.2d 571 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, 96 S. Ct. 867 (1976) (applying Louisiana
law).
56. Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 122.
57. Tate, supra note 52, at 904 (emphasis added).
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lem. This is true in two respects: (1) Louisiana Revised Statute 10:5-
114(3) suggests that reimbursement is allowed only when a bank has
duly honored a letter of credit; and (2) the limited number of Louisiana
cases prior to Holden that pertain to wrongful honor suggest that
reimbursement will only be allowed if the issuer strictly complies with
the stipulations of the credit agreement. Thus, the Holden court most
likely would have reasoned that any denial of reimbursement, despite
the windfall to the customer, is justified under the present state of law
in Louisiana. Hence, dura lex sed lex.
VI. ScoTT v. BANvK OF COUSHATTA: A RED FLAG FOR BANKERS
The Facts and Holding
The problem that Holden raises for banks is no doubt enhanced by
the case Scott v. Bank of Coushatta." In Scott, customers (the Scotts)
brought an action against the bank demanding cancellation of a mortgage
on their property. They had used the property as collateral for a prom-
issory note (dated August 4, 1980), executed for their son pursuant to
the purchase of a car.19 Approximately one year later (August 18, 1981),
the son obtained a new loan from the bank to purchase a truck. He
forged the signatures of his parents to the note without their permission,
and the bank, unaware of the son's act at the time, treated the new
note as a novation, thus extinguishing the former obligation of the
Scotts. The Scotts sometime later received notice from the bank that
the new note was due. They then filed suit against the bank demanding
cancellation of the mortgage on their property and seeking damages.
The trial court held that the Scotts could not be held liable on the
former note and that the second note had the effect of cancelling the
previous obligation. The court of appeal reversed. It held that the latter
note was a renewal of the former one and that the Scotts still owed
the obligation evidenced by the former noteA°
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. The court stated that when
the bank marked "paid" on the former note, it evidenced an intent to
release the debtor. Hence, it construed the later note as a "novation."
The effect of the novation, from the bank's standpoint, was to give
the Scotts a windfall for the balance remaining on the first note and
to cause the bank to suffer a loss.
58. 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987).
59. The facts indicate that Mrs. 'Scott signed both her name and Mr. Scott's name
to the promissory note. She did so with Mr. Scott's permission. The effect of their
signatures, however, made them liable on the note in the event their son failed to fulfill
his obligation to make payments on the car.
60. Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 501 So. 2d 1032, 1036 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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Although the bank argued that the later note had been entered into
by error and hence should have resulted in a vitiation of consent on
its part, the court held that the bank's inexcusable neglect precluded it
from successfully rescinding the novation. 61 The negligence, according
to the court, was due to the bank's failure to check pertinent signature
cards of the Scotts which were on file and which would have put the
bank on notice that the forged signatures were in fact not the Scotts'.
In a persuasive dissenting opinion, Justice Dennis argued that such
a ruling "breaks with precedents establishing an inexcusable error rule
and can only result in requiring bankers to take extreme precautions
that will impose unnecessary costs of time, inconvenience and expense
on honest, reasonable bank customers."62 Dennis argued that the bank
in this case was not guilty of inexcusable error or gross fault. The bank
was guilty only of very slight negligence. 6 He concluded that because
the bank was merely trying to avoid a loss whereas the customer was
seeking a windfall, the bank should not be barred from rescinding the
later obligation because of its error induced by the Scotts' son. 64
Implications of Scott
The result in Scott is analogous to the decision in Holden. In both
cases, there were contracts, very slight negligence (if any in Holden),
and a refusal by the respective courts to allow the banks recovery on
their loss. The dissenting opinion by Dennis in Scott raises some of the
same troublesome implications found in the Holden decision. For ex-
ample, if a bank, as in Holden, is held to a strict compliance standard
in wrongful honor cases, particularly when it has exercised good faith
in the transaction, such a rigid standard will force banks to exercise
precautions not customary in ordinary business. These additional pre-
cautions will in turn increase delay, inconvenience, and overhead costs
for the bank, which ultimately will be passed on to bank customers.65
Despite the harshness of both Holden and Scott, these cases, nev-
ertheless, represent the status of the law in Louisiana and serve as strong
warnings to banks to exercise extreme caution in their banking practices.
VII. GUIDELES FOR BANKs n LIOHT OF HOLDEN
In light of the strict requirements placed on banks in letter of credit
agreements, several guidelines are suggested to help banks alleviate some
61. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 361.
62. Id. at 365 (Dennis. J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 366 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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of the potential problems prior to entering such agreements. First, banks
should attempt to acquire adequate security to ensure a customer's
performance in the event that the bank has to pay on the letter of
credit. Promissory notes by themselves are less than adequate as evi-
denced by Holden. Funds on hand are by far the best. 66
Second, the bank should endeavor to secure a comprehensive re-
imbursement agreement from its customer prior to entering a letter of
credit arrangement. It is doubtful that a bank can secure an agreement
that would exculpate it from any action it might take. For example, in
Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving Trust Co. ,67 the letter of credit provided
for absolute discretion by the issuer, and the customer agreed to re-
imburse the bank despite the documents being insufficient, defective, or
even forgeries." Although Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:5-109 does not
necessarily preclude such an agreement,6 9 10:1-102(3) regarding disclaim-
ers of "good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care" might invalidate
it.7o Thus, although broad exculpatory agreements may be problematic,
clauses of more limited application should withstand the test of 10:1-
102(3). Consequently, an issuer acting reasonably in paying a draft
arguably should be protected by such a clause.7 1
Third, if the issuing bank pays a beneficiary because the customer
has failed in some way to honor its underlying contract with the ben-
eficiary, the bank's right of reimbursement should be enforceable through
the doctrine of subrogation. Although some cases have held that such
an action violates the notion of independence by interfering with the
underlying contract between customer and beneficiary, 2 Hawkland and
Holland suggest that this is incorrect. 3 They espouse the position that
in the absence of agreements between the issuer and customer that would
allow it to pursue the customer after paying the beneficiary, "the issuing
bank ought to be put in the same position that the beneficiary occupied
with regard to the right to pursue the customer. 7 4
Finally, the safest guideline for a bank to follow is to examine
carefully any documents or papers pursuant to payment on a letter of
credit. The law now requires strict compliance, even in wrongful honor
66. White & Summers, supra note 27, at 865.
67. 82 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
68. Id. at 74; see also White & Summers, supra note 27, at 865 n.9.
69. One could conceivably argue that the clause "unless otherwise agreed" in La.
R.S. 10:5-109(l) allows for such a broad disclaimer.
70. White & Summers, supra note 27, at 865; see also Hawkland & Holland, UCC
Series § 5-114:13 (1986).
71. White & Summers, supra note 27, at 865.
72. In Re Economic Enterprises, Inc., 44 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); see also
Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving Trust Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 72, 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
73. Hawkland & Holland, UCC Series § 5-114:13 (Supp. 1991).
74. Id.
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situations. Holden thus serves as a strong warning and incentive for
banks to exercise extreme precaution when paying on a letter of credit.
After Holden, a bank cannot merely wink at the credit when paying.
Tracy L. Howard
